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Abstract
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans
to execution in the same environment, conflicts may
arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common uti-
lization of resources. In this case, an agent can post-
pone the execution of a particular action, if this punc-
tually solves the conflict, or it can resort to execute a
different plan if the agent’s payoff significantly dimin-
ishes due to the action deferral. In this paper, we present
a game-theoretic approach to non-cooperative planning
that helps predict before execution what plan schedules
agents will adopt so that the set of strategies of all agents
constitute a Nash equilibrium. We perform some ex-
periments and discuss the solutions obtained with our
game-theoretical approach, analyzing how the conflicts
between the plans determine the strategic behavior of
the agents.
Introduction
Multi-agent Planning (MAP) with self-interested agents is
the problem of coordinating a group of agents that com-
pete to make their strategic behavior prevail over the oth-
ers’: agents competing for a particular goal or the utiliza-
tion of a common resource, agents competing to maximize
their benefit or agents willing to form coalitions with others
in order to achieve better their own goals or preferences. In
this paper, we focus on game-theoretic MAP approaches for
self-interested agents.
Brafman et al (Brafman et al. 2009) introduce the
Coalition-Planning Game (CoPG), a game-theoretic ap-
proach for self-interested agents which have personal goals
and costs but may find it beneficial to cooperate with each
other provided that the coalition formation helps increase
their personal net benefit. In particular, authors propose a
theoretical framework for stable planning in acyclic CoPG
which is limited to one goal per agent. Following the line
of CoPG, the work in (Crosby and Rovatsos 2011) presents
an approach that combines heuristic calculations in existing
planners for solving a restricted subset of CoPGs. In gen-
eral, there has been a rather intensive research on coopera-
tive self-interest agents as, for example, for modeling the be-
havior of planning agents in groups (Hadad et al. 2013) and
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in coalitional resource game scenarios (Dunne et al. 2010),
among others.
On the other hand, game-theoretic non-cooperative MAP
approaches aim, in general, at finding a Nash Equilib-
rium joint plan out of the individual plans of the agents.
’Pure’ game-theoretic approaches, like (Bowling, Jensen,
and Veloso 2003) and (Larbi, Konieczny, and Marquis 2007)
perform a strategic analysis of all possible agent plans
and define notions of equilibria by analyzing the relation-
ships between different solutions in game-theoretic terms.
In (Bowling, Jensen, and Veloso 2003), MAP solutions are
classified according to the agents’ possibility of reaching
their goals and the paths of execution (combinations of local
plans). Similarly, satisfaction profiles in (Larbi, Konieczny,
and Marquis 2007) are defined by the level of assurance of
reaching the agent’s goals. A different approach using best-
response was proposed to solve congestion games and to
perform plan improvement in general MAP scenarios from
an available initial joint plan (Jonsson and Rovatsos 2011).
Game-theoretic approaches that evaluate every strategy of
every agent against all other strategies are ineffective for
planning, since even if plan length is bounded polynomially,
the number of available strategies is exponential (Nissim and
Brafman 2013). However, in environments where coopera-
tion is not allowed or calculating an initial joint plan is not
possible, game-theoretic approaches are useful. Take, for in-
stance, the modeling of a transportation network, sending
packets through the Internet or a network traffic, where in-
dividuals need to evaluate routes in the presence of the con-
gestion resulting from the decisions made by themselves and
everyone else (Easley and Kleinberg 2010). In this sense, we
argue that game-theoretic reasoning is a valid approach for
this specific type of planning problems, among others.
In this paper, we present a novel game-theoretic non-
cooperative model to MAP with self-interested agents that
solves the following problem. We consider a group of agents
where each agent has one or several plans that achieve one
or more goals. Executing a particular plan reports a bene-
fit to the agent depending on the number of goals achieved,
makespan of the plan or cost of the actions. Agents oper-
ate in a common environment, what may provoke interac-
tions between the agents’ plans and thus preventing a con-
current execution. Each agent is willing to execute the plan
that maximizes its benefit but it ignores which plan the other
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agents will point out, how his plan will be interleaved with
theirs and the impact of such coordination on his benefit.
We present a two-game proposal to tackle this problem.
A general game in which agents take a strategic decision
on which joint plan to execute, and an internal game that,
given one plan per agent, returns an equilibrium joint plan
schedule. Agents play the internal game to simulate the si-
multaneous execution of their plans, find out the possibil-
ities to coordinate in case of interactions and the effect of
such coordination on their final benefit. The approach of
the general game is very similar to the work described in
(Larbi, Konieczny, and Marquis 2007); specifically, our pro-
posal contributes with several novelties:
• Introduction of soft goals to account for the case in which
a joint plan that achieves all the goals of every agent is
not feasible due to the interactions between the agents’
plans. The aim of the general game is precisely to select
an equilibrium joint plan that encompasses the ’best’ plan
of each agent.
• An explicit handling of conflicts between actions and a
mechanism for updating the plan benefit based on the
penalty derived from the conflict repair. This is precisely
the objective of the internal game and the key contribution
that makes our model a more realistic approach to MAP
with self-interested agents.
• An implementation of the theoretical framework, us-
ing the Gambit tool (McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy
2014) for solving the general game and our own program
for the internal game.
We wish to highlight that the model presented in this pa-
per is not intended to solve a complete planning problem due
to the exponential complexity inherent to game-theoretic ap-
proaches. The model is aimed at solving a specific situation
where the alternative plans of the agents are particularly lim-
ited to such situation and thus plans would be of a relatively
similar and small size.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides an overview of the problem, introduces the notation
that we will use throughout the paper and describes the gen-
eral game in detail. The following section is devoted to the
specification of the internal game, which we call the joint
plan schedule game. Section ’Experimental results’ shows
some experiments carried out with our model and last sec-
tion concludes.
Problem Specification
The problem we want to solve is specified as follows. There
is a set of n rational, self-interested agents N = {1, ..., n}
where each agent i has a collection of independent plans Πi
that accomplish one or several goals. Executing a particular
plan pi provides the owner agent a real-valued benefit given
by the function β : Π → R. The benefit that agent i obtains
from plan pi is denoted by βi(pi); in this work, we make this
value dependent on the number of goals achieved by pi and
the makespan of pi but different measures of reward and cost
might be used, like the relevance of the achieved goals to
agent i or the cost of the actions of pi. Each agent i wishes
to execute a plan pi such that max(βi(pi)),∀pi ∈ Πi; how-
ever, since agents have to execute their plans simultaneously
in a common environment, conflicts may arise that prevent
agents from executing their preferable plans. Let’s assume
that pi and pi′ are the maximum benefit plans of agents i and
j, respectively, and that the simultaneous execution of pi and
pi′ is not possible due to a conflict between the two plans. If
this happens, several options are analyzed:
• agent i (agent j, respectively) considers to adapt the ex-
ecution of its plan pi (pi′, respectively) to the plan of the
other agent by, for instance, delaying the execution of one
or more actions of pi so that this delay solves the conflict.
This has an impact in βi(pi) since any delay in the execu-
tion of pi diminishes the value of its original benefit.
• agent i (agent j, respectively) considers to switch to an-
other plan in Πi (Πj , respectively) which does not cause
any conflict with the plan pi′ (pi, respectively).
Agents wish to choose their maximum benefit plan but
then the choices of the other agents can affect each other’s
benefits. This is the reason we propose a game-theoretic ap-
proach to solve this problem.
A plan pi is defined as a sequence of non-temporal actions
pi = [a1, . . . , am]
1. Assuming t = 0 is the start time when
the agents begin the execution of one of their plans, the ex-
ecution of pi would ideally take m units of time, executing
a1 at time t = 0 and the rest of actions at consecutive time
instants, thus finishing the execution of pi at time t = m− 1
(last action is scheduled at m − 1). This is called the earli-
est plan execution as it denotes that the start time and finish
time of the execution pi are scheduled at the earliest possi-
ble times. However, if conflicts between pi and the plans of
other agents arise, then the actions of pi might likely not to
be realized at their earliest times, in which case a tentative
solution could be to delay the execution of some action in pi
so as to avoid the conflict. Therefore, given a plan pi, we can
find infinite schedules for the execution of pi.
Definition 1 Given a plan pi = [a1, . . . , am], Ψpi is an in-
finite set that contains all possible schedules for pi. Par-
ticularly, we define as ψ0 the earliest plan execution of pi
that finishes at time m − 1. Given two different schedules
ψj , ψj+1 ∈ Ψpi , the finish time of ψj is prior or equal to the
finish time of ψj+1.
Let ψj , where j 6= 0, be a schedule for pi that finishes at
time t > m − 1. The net benefit that the agent obtains with
ψj diminishes with respect to βi(pi). The loss of benefit is
a consequence of the delayed execution of pi and this delay
may affect agents differently. For instance, if for agent i the
delay of ψj wrt to ψ0 has a low incidence in βi(pi), then
i might still wish to execute ψj . However, for a different
agent k, a particular schedule of a plan pi′ ∈ Πk may have a
great impact in βk(pi′) even resulting in a negative net ben-
efit. How delays affect the benefit of the agents depends on
the intrinsic characteristics of the agents.
Definition 2 We define a utility function µ : Ψ → R that
returns the net value of a plan schedule. Thus, µi(ψj), ψj ∈
1In this first approach, we consider only instantaneous actions
Ψpi , is the utility that agent i receives from executing the
schedule ψj for plan pi. By default, for any given plan pi and
ψ0 ∈ Ψpi , µi(ψ0) = βi(pi).
A rational way of solving the conflicts of interest that arise
among a set of self-interested agents who all wish to execute
their maximum benefit plan comes from the non-cooperative
game theory. Therefore, our general game is modeled as a
non-cooperative game in the Normal-Form. The agents are
the players of the game; the set of actions Ai is modeled as
the game actions (plans) available to agent i, and the payoff
function is defined as the result of a rational selection of a
plan schedule for each agent. Formally:
Definition 3 We define our general game as a tuple
(N,P, ρ), where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of n self-interested players.
• P = P1× ...×Pn, where Pi = Πi,∀i ∈ N . Each agent i
has a finite set of strategies which are the plans contained
in Πi. We will then call a plan profile the n-tuple p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pn), where pi ∈ Πi for each agent i.
• ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρn) where ρi : P → R is a real-valued payoff
function for agent i. ρi(p) is defined as the utility of the
schedule of plan pi when pi is executed simultaneously
with (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn).
The plan profile p represents the plan choice of each
agent. Every agent i wishes to execute the schedule ψ0 ∈
Ψpi . Since this may not be feasible, agents have to agree
on a joint plan schedule. We define a procedure named
joint plan schedule that receives as input a plan profile p
and returns a schedule profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), where
∀i ∈ N, si ∈ Ψpi . The schedule profile s is a consistent
joint plan schedule; i.e., all of the individual plan schedules
in s can be simultaneously executed without provoking any
conflict. The joint plan schedule procedure, whose details
are given in the next section, defines our internal game.
Let p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) be a plan profile and s =
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) the schedule profile for p. Then, we have
that ρi(p) = µi(si).
The game returns a scheduled plan profile that is a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) solution. This represents a stable solu-
tion from which no agent benefits from invalidating another
agent’s plan schedule.
The joint plan schedule game
This section describes the internal game. The problem con-
sists in finding a feasible joint plan schedule for a given plan
profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), where each agent i wishes to
execute its plan pi under the earliest plan schedule (ψ0).
Since potential conflicts between the actions of the plans of
different agents may prevent some of them from executing
ψ0, agents get engaged in a game in order to come up with a
rational decision that maximizes their expected utility.
For a particular plan pi, an action a ∈ pi is given by the
triple a = 〈pre(a), add(a), del(a)〉, where pre(a) is the set
of conditions that must hold in a state S for the action to
be applicable, add(a) is its add list, and del(a) is its delete
list, each a set of literals. Let a and a′ be two actions, both
scheduled at time t, in the plans of two different agents; a
conflict between a and a′ occurs at t if the two actions are
mutually exclusive (mutex) at t (Blum and Furst 1997).
The joint plan schedule game is actually the result of sim-
ulating the execution of all the agents’ plans. At each time
t, every agent i makes a move, which consists in executing
the next action a in its plan pi or executing the empty action
(⊥). The empty action is the default mechanism to avoid
two actions that are mutex at t, and this implies a deferral in
the execution of a. A concept similar to ⊥, called the empty
sequence, is used in (Larbi, Konieczny, and Marquis 2007)
as a neutral element for calculating the permutations of the
plans of two agents, although the particular implication of
this empty sequence in the plan or in the evaluation of the
satisfaction profiles is not described.
Search space of the internal game
Several issues must be considered when creating the search
space of the internal game:
1) Simultaneous and sequential execution of the game.
The internal game is essentially a multi-round sequential
game since the simulation of the plans execution occurs
along time, one action of each player at a time. Then, the
execution at time t+ 1 only takes place when every agent
has moved at time t, so that players observe the choices
of the rest of agents at t. In contrast, the game at time t
represents the simultaneous moves of the agents at that
time. Simultaneous moves can always be rephrased as se-
quential moves with imperfect information, in which case
agents would likely get ’stuck’ if their actions are mu-
tex; that is, agents would not have the possibility of co-
ordinating their actions. Therefore, simultaneous moves
at t are also simulated as sequential moves as if agents
would know the intention of the other agents. In essence,
this can be interpreted as agents analyzing the possibilities
of avoiding the conflict and then playing simultaneously
the choice that reports a stable solution. Obviously, this
means that agents would know the strategies of the others
at time t, what seems reasonable if they are all interested
in maximizing their utility.
2) Applicability of the actions. Unlike other games where
the agents’ strategies are always applicable, in planning
it may happen that an action a of a plan is not executable
at time t in the state resulting from the execution of the
t−1 previous steps. In such a case, the schedule profile is
discarded. In our model, a schedule profile s is a solution
if s comprises a plan schedule for every agent. Otherwise,
we would be considering coalitions of agents that discard
strategies that do not fit with the strategies of the coalition
members. On the other hand,⊥ is only applicable at t if at
least any other agent applies a non-empty action at t . The
empty action is also applicable when the agent has played
all the actions of its plan.
Example. Consider a plan profile p = (p1, p2) of two
agents, where p1 = [a1, a2, a3] and p2 = [b1, b2, b3].
s = (s1, s2) with s1 = (a1,⊥,⊥, a2, a3) and s2 =
(⊥, b1, b2, b3,⊥) is a valid joint schedule if all the actions
scheduled at each time t are not mutex.
Definition 4 Given a plan profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), s =
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a valid schedule profile to p if every si
is a non-empty plan schedule and the actions of every pi
scheduled at each time t are not mutex.
Following, we formally define our internal game.
Definition 5 A perfect-information extensive-form game
consists of:
• a set of players, N = {1, . . . , n}
• a finite set X of nodes that form the tree, with S ⊂ X
being the terminal nodes
• a set of functions that describe each x 6∈ S:
– the player i(x) who moves at x
– the set A(x) of possible actions at x
– the successor node n(x, a) resulting from action a
• n payoff functions that assign a payoff to each player as
a function of the terminal node reached
Let pi = [a1, . . . , am] be the plan of agent i. The setA(x)
of possible actions of i at x isA(x) = {a,⊥}, where a is the
action of pi that has to be executed next, which comes de-
termined by the evolution of the game so far. Only in the
case that agent i has already played the m actions of pi,
A(x) = {⊥}. As commented above, each agent makes a
move at a time so the first n levels of the tree represent the
moves of the n agents at time t, the next n levels represent
the moves of the n agents at t+ 1 and so on.
A node x of the game tree represents the planning state
after executing the path from the root node until x. For each
node x, there are at most two successor nodes, each corre-
sponding to the application of the actions in A(x). A termi-
nal node s denotes a valid schedule profile.
Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be a terminal node; the payoff of
player i at s is given by µi(si). Note that the solution of the
internal game for a plan profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) is one
of the terminal nodes of the game tree, and the payoff for
each player i represents the value of ρi(p). Then, the payoff
vector of the solution terminal node is the payoff vector of
one of the cells in the general game.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)
The solution concept we apply in our internal game is the
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (Shoham and Leyton-Brown
2009, Chapter 5), a concept that refines a NE in perfect-
information extensive-form games by eliminating those un-
wanted Nash Equilibra. The SPE of a game are all strategy
profiles that are NE for any subgame. By definition, every
SPE is also a NE, but not every NE is SPE. The SPE elimi-
nates the so-called “noncredible threats”, that is, those situa-
tions in which an agent i threatens the other agents to choose
a node that is harmful for all of them, with the intention of
forcing the other players to change their decisions, thus al-
lowing i to reach a more profitable node. However, this type
of threats are non credible because a self-interested agent
would not jeopardize its utility.
A common method to find a SPE in a finite perfect-
information extensive-form game is the backward induction
algorithm. This algorithm has the advantage that it can be
computed in linear time in the size of the game tree, in con-
trast to the best known methods to find NE that require time
exponential in the size of the normal-form. In addition, it
can be implemented as a single depth-first traversal of the
game tree. We consider the SPE as the most adequate so-
lution concept for our joint plan schedule game since SPE
reflects the strategic behavior of a self-interested agent tak-
ing into account the decision of the rest of agents to reach
the most preferable solution in a common environment.
The SPE solution concept provides us a strong argument
to solve the problem of selecting a joint plan schedule as a
perfect-information extensive-form game instead of using,
for example, a planner that returns all possible combinations
of the agents’ plans. In this latter case, the question would
be which policy to apply to choose one schedule over the
other. We could apply criteria such as Pareto-optimality2 or
the maximum social welfare3. However, a Pareto-dominant
solution does not always exist in all problems and the high-
est social welfare solution may be different from the SPE
solution. That is, neither of these solution concepts would
actually reflect how the fate of one agent is impacted by the
actions of others.
The SPE solution concept has also some limitations. First,
there could exist multiple SPE in a game, in which case
one SPE may be chosen randomly. Second, the order of the
agents when building the tree is relevant for the game in
some situations. Consider, for instance, the case of a two-
agent game. The application of the backward induction al-
gorithm would give some advantage to the first agent in
those cases for which there exist two different schedules to
avoid the mutex (delaying one agent’s action over the other
or viceversa). In this case, the first agent will then select the
solution that does not delay its conflicting action. Notice that
in these situations both solutions are SPE and thus equally
good from a game-theoretic perspective. Any other conflict-
solving mechanism would also favour one agent over the
other one depending on the used criteria; for instance, a plan-
ner would favour the agent whose delay returns the short-
est makespan solution, and a more social-oriented approach
would give advantage to the agent whose delay minimizes
the overall welfare. In order to alleviate the impact of the
order of the agents in the SPE solution, agents are randomly
chosen in the tree generation.
An example of an extensive-form tree for a particular joint
plan schedule problem can be seen in Figure 1. The tree rep-
resents the internal game of two agents A and B with plans
piA = [a1, a2] and piB = [b1, b2]. The letter above an action
represent its precondition, the letter below represents its ef-
fects. Thus, p ∈ pre(a2), p ∈ pre(b1), ¬p ∈ del(b1) and
p ∈ add(b2). At each non-terminal node, the corresponding
agent generates its successors; in case of a non-applicable
action, the branch is pruned. For example, in node 2 agent
A tries to put its action a2, but this is not possible because
in that state a previous action b1 deleted p. Another exam-
2A vector Pareto-dominates another one if each of the compo-
nents of the first one is greater or equal to the corresponding com-
ponent in the second one.
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Figure 1: Tree example
ple of non applicable action is shown in the right branch of
node 6. In this case, agent B tries to apply the empty action
⊥, but this option is also discarded because agent A has also
applied an empty action in the same time step (t = 0).
In the tree example of Figure 1, we assume that both
agents A and B have the same utility function, that a de-
lay means a penalty proportional to the utility, and that
β(piA) = β(piB) = 10. If we apply the backward induc-
tion algorithm to the this extensive-form game, it returns the
joint schedule profile js1, or its equivalent js4. This sched-
ule profile reports the highest possible utility for agent B,
and a penalty of one unit (generic penalty) for agent A. Let’s
see how the backward induction algorithm obtains the SPE
in this example. The payoffs of js1 are back up to node 2,
where they will be compared with the values of node 5. The
joint schedule js2 is backed up to node 5 because agent A
is who chooses at node 5. Then, in node 1 agent B chooses
between node 2 and node 5 and hence, js1 is chosen. In the
other branches, in node 8 js4 will prevail over js5 and then,
when compared in node 7 with js6, the choice of agent A
is js4. This results in agent A choosing at node 0 between
js1 and js4, both with the same payoffs, and so both are
equivalent SPE solutions. If the tree is developed following
a different agent order the SPE solution will be the same.
Experimental results
In this section, we present some experimental results in or-
der to validate and discuss our approach. As several factors
can affect the solutions of the general game, we show differ-
ent examples of game situations.
We implemented a program to generation the extensive-
form tree and apply the backward induction algorithm. The
NE in the normal-form game is computed with the tool
Gambit (McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy 2014).
For the experiments we used problems of the well-known
Zeno-Travel domain from the International Planning Com-
petition (IPC-3)4. However, for simplicity and the sake of
clarity, we show generic actions in the figures.
4http://ipc.icaps-conference.org/
The experiments were carried out for two agents, A and B.
Both agents have a set of individual plans that solve one or
more goals. The more goals achieved by a plan, the more the
benefit of the plan. In addition, the benefit of a plan depends
on the makespan of such plan. Given a plan pi, which earli-
est plan execution is denoted by ψ0, βi(pi) is calculated as
follows: βi(pi) = nGoals(pi) ∗ 10−makespan(ψ0), where
nGoals(pi) represents the number of goals solved by pi and
makespan(ψ0) represents the minimum duration schedule
for pi.
The utility of a particular schedule ψ ∈ Ψpi is a func-
tion of βi(pi) and the number of time units that the actions
of pi are delayed in ψ with respect to the earliest plan ex-
ecution ψ0; in other words, the difference in the makespan
of ψ and ψ0. Thus, µi(ψ) = βi(pi) if ψ = ψ0. Otherwise,
µi(ψ) = βi(pi)− delay(ψ), where delay(ψ) is the delay in
the makespan of ψ with respect to the makespan of ψ0.
Problem Agent Plan nAct(pi) βi(pi)
1
A
piA1(g1g2) 3 17
piA2(g1) 2 8
piA3(g2) 1 9
B
piB1(g1g2) 2 18
piB2(g1) 1 9
piB3(g2) 1 9
2
A
piA1(g1g2) 2 18
piA2(g1g2) 4 16
piA3(g1) 2 8
piA4(g2) 1 9
B
piB1(g1g2) 2 18
piB2(g1g2) 4 16
piB3(g1) 1 9
piB4(g2) 1 9
Table 1: Problems description
Table 1 shows the problems used in these experiments:
the set of initial plans of each agent, the number of actions
of each plan and its utility.
piB1 piB2 piB3
piA1 15,16 (2,2) 17,7 (0,2) 17,9 (0,0)
piA2 8,16 (0,2) 8,7 (0,2) 7,9 (1,0)
piA3 7,18 (2,0) 9,9 (0,0) 8,9 (1,0)
Table 2: Problem 1
In Table 2 we can see the results of the general game for
problem 1. Each cell is the result of a joint plan schedule
game that combines a plan of agent A and a plan of agent
B. In each cell, we show the payoff of piAx and piBy as well
as the values of delay(ψ) for each plan (delay values are
shown between parenthesis). The values in each cell are the
result of the schedule profile returned by the internal game.
The NE of this problem is the combination of piA1 and
piB1, with an utility of (15,16) for agent A and B, respec-
tively. Agent A uses the plan that solves its goals g1 and g2
delayed two time steps. Agent B uses the plan that solves
its goals g1 and g2, also delayed two time steps. The solu-
tion for both agents is to use the plan that solves more goals
(with a higher initial benefit) a bit delayed. This can be a
typical situation if there are not many conflicts and if the de-
lay is not very punishing to the agents. The schedule of this
solution is shown in Figure 2. We can see in the figure that
agent A starts the execution of its plan piA1 at t = 0, but after
having scheduled its first two actions, the strategy of agent
A introduces a delay of two time steps (empty actions) until
it can finally execute its final action without causing a mu-
tex with the actions of agent B. Regarding agent B, its first
action in piB1 is delayed two time units to avoid the conflict
with agent A. In this example, both agents have a conflict
with each other (both have an action which deletes a condi-
tion that the other agent needs).
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Figure 2: Schedule example
Table 3 represents the game in normal-form of problem 2
shown in Table 1. In this case, we find three different equi-
libria: (piA1, piB2) with payoffs (15,14) and delays (3,2) for
agent A and B, respectively; another NE is (piA2, piB1), with
payoffs (14,15) and a delay of (2,3) time steps, respectively;
the last NE is a mixed strategy with probabilities 0.001 and
0.999 for piA1 and piA2 of agent A, and probabilities 0.001
and 0.999 for strategies piB1 and piB2 of agent B. In this
problem we have a cell with−∞ as payoff of the two agents.
This payoff represents that there does not exist a valid joint
schedule for the plans due to an unsolvable conflict as the
one shown in Figure 3.
piB1 piB2 piB3 piB4
piA1 −∞,−∞ 15,14 (3,2) 18,7 (0,2) 17,9 (1,0)
piA2 14,15 (2,3) 14,14 (2,2) 16,6 (0,3) 16,9 (0,0)
piA3 8,16 (0,2) 8,16 (0,0) 8,7 (0,2) 8,8 (0,1)
piA4 7,18 (2,0) 6,16 (3,0) 9,9 (0,0) 8,9 (1,0)
Table 3: Problem 2
The game in Table 4 is the same game as the one in Table
3 but, in this case, the agents suffer a delay penalty of 3.5
(instead of 1) per each action delayed in their plan sched-
ules. Under this new evaluation, we can see how this affects
the general game. In this situation, the only NE solution is
(piA2, piB2) with utility values (9,9) and a delay of two time
a
1
a
2
b
1
b
2
¬q
¬p
p
q
A
Bπ
π
Figure 3: Unsolvable conflict
steps for each agent. Note that this solution is neither Pareto-
optimal (solution (16,9) is Pareto-optimal) nor it maximizes
the social welfare. However, these two solution concepts can
be applied in case of multiple NE.
piB1 piB2 piB3 piB4
piA1 −∞,−∞ 7.5,9 (3,2) 18,2 (0,2) 14.5,9 (1,0)
piA2 9,7.5 (2,3) 9,9 (2,2) 16,-1.5 (0,3) 16,9 (0,0)
piA3 8,11 (0,2) 8,16 (0,0) 8,2 (0,2) 8,5.5 (0,1)
piA4 2,18 (2,0) -1.5,16 (3,0) 9,9 (0,0) 5.5,9 (1,0)
Table 4: Problem 2b, more delay penalty to the utility
In conclusion, our approach simulates how agents behave
with several strategies and it returns an equilibrium solution
that is stable for all of the agents. All agents participate in
the schedule profile solution and their utilities are dependent
on the strategies of the other agents regarding the conflicts
that appear in the problem.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented a complete game-theoretic
approximation for non-cooperative agents. The strategies of
the agents are determined by the different ways of solving
mutex actions at a time instant and the loss of utility of the
solutions in the plan schedules. We also present some exper-
iments carried out in a particular planning domain. The re-
sults show that the SPE solution of the extensive-form game
in combination with the NE of the general game return a sta-
ble solution that responds to the strategic behavior of all of
the agents.
As for future work, we intend to explore two different
lines of investigation. The exponential cost of this approach
represents a major limitation for being used as a general
MAP method for self-interested agents. Our combination
of a general+internal game can be successively applied in
subproblems of the agents. Considering that this approach
solves a subset of goals of an agent, the agent could get en-
gaged in a new game to solve the rest of his goals, and like-
wise for the rest of agents. Then, a MAP problem can be
viewed as solving a subset of goals in each repetition of the
whole game. In this line, the utility functions of the agents
can be modeled not only to consider the benefit of the current
schedule profile but also to predict the impact of this strategy
profile in the resolution of the future goals. That is, we can
define payoffs as a combination of the utility gained in the
current game plus an estimate of how the joint plan schedule
would impact in the resolution of the remaining goals.
Another line of investigation is to extend this approach to
cooperative games, allowing the formation of coalitions of
agents if the coalition represents a more advantageous strat-
egy than playing alone.
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